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JEFFREY 0. COOPER**
Many commentators, including ChiefJudge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., argue that
unpublished opinions serve as a necessary tool for federal appellate courts to
manage their caseload and to avoid confusion in the creation of legal doctrine.
Moreover, Chief Judge Martin and others assert that, for this tool to operate
effectively, citations to unpublished opinions must be strictly prohibited.
The authors agree that unpublished opinions can play a vital role in the
operations of the federal courts of appeals. The authors urge, however, that this
role should be reconceived in light of the unique institutional structure of the
federal courts of appeals. The authors observe that the federal appeals courts
must render a decision on every case brought before them, and that, because the
Supreme Court rarely grants certiorar, the decisions of the federal court of
appeals will usually be final. In addition, most cases are decided by a three-
judge panel that is designated to speak for the entire court-the decision of this
three-judge panel is considered binding upon all judges in the circuit for all
future cases. The interaction of these unique institutional factors places the
courts in a difficult position when new or unsettled legal issues are raised The
authors argue that, in these circumstances, unpublished opinions can play an
important role in the development of legal doctrine, allowing appellate judges to
engage in an intra-court dialogue before reaching a firm resolution of difficult
legal issues. For unpublished opinions to play this role, however, practitioners
must be allowed to cite to them.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his article, In Defense of Unpublished Opinions,' Chief Judge Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., offers a thoughtful defense, informed by his two decades on the
bench, of the use of unpublished opinions by the federal courts of appeals. Judge
Martin posits that unpublished opinions are essential to allow the courts to
manage their caseload and to avoid the muddying of legal doctrine that, he
contends, would necessarily accompany the requirement of published opinions in
unremarkable cases.2 We agree with Chief Judge Martin that unpublished
* Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law.
** Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. We extend thanks
to James Brudney, Tom Gallanis, Arthur Greenbaum and Deborah Merritt for their thoughtful
comments on previous drafts. We are also grateful to Karen Butler Reisinger of the Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis and Brian Cunningham of the Ohio State University
College of Law for their invaluable research assistance.
1 Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHio ST. L.J 177 (1999).
2 See id at 189-93.
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opinions play an important, even a necessary role in the workings of the courts of
appeals. We disagree, however, about precisely what that role should be. We
believe that, used properly, unpublished opinions can facilitate not merely the
resolution of individual cases but also the sound development of circuit law over
time. But, for unpublished opinions to have this additional function, circuit judges
must appreciate the special value of unpublished opinions within the unique
institutional structure of the federal courts of appeals, and lawyers must be able to
cite these opinions in subsequent cases. For this reason, we question Chief Judge
Martin's ultimate conclusion that, for unpublished opinions to play their proper
role, those opinions must lack any precedential value and must never be cited by
litigants3
From our perspective, the Sixth Circuit rule assailed by Chief Judge Martin,
which permits, but discourages, the citation of unpublished opinions, comes
closer to the desirable use of unpublished opinions than do the more restrictive
no-citation rules in place in other circuits.4 Such a rule, as we explain herein, best
balances the competing pressures on the courts of appeals to resolve the cases that
litigants place before them while simultaneously developing and maintaining a
coherent body of law. In the end, we believe that unpublished opinions, if
3 See i d at 194-95.
4 Compare 6TH CIR. I 24(c) (disfavoring the citation of unpublished opinions unless to
establish res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case, or unless counsel believes that the
unpublished opinion has precedential value and no other published opinion "would serve as
well"), with lST CH. R. 36.2(b)(6) (limiting citation of unpublished opinions to "related cases"),
and 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (prohibiting citation of oral decisions rendered from the bench and
summary orders in unrelated cases), and 7TH CIa. K. 53(b)(2)(iv) (prohibiting the citation of
unpublished opinions as precedent except to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of
the case), and 9TH CIR. t 36-3 (prohibiting the citation of any disposition that is not designated
for publication under 9TH CIR. IL 36-5 as precedent except to establish res judicata, collateral
estoppel or the law of the case), and D.C. CI R.I 28(c) (prohibiting citation to unpublished
opinions as precedent), and FED. CI. i. 47.6 (prohibiting citation of unpublished opinion as
precedent).
The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have local rules governing
unpublished opinions that are similar to the Sixth Circuit's. See 4TH CiR. t 36(c) (disfavoring
citation to unpublished opinions except to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the
case, but allowing citation if counsel believes that an unpublished opinion has precedential
value and no other published opinion "would serve as well'); 5TH CiR. t 47.5A (permitting
limited citation to unpublished opinions while providing that they "are not precedenf' but
"may... be persuasive'); 8TH CIR. t 28A(k) (indicating that unpublished opinions should not
be cited as precedent except to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case and
allowing citation of an unpublished opinion for persuasive value only when no other published
opinion "would serve as well"); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (asserting that unpublished opinions are not
precedent except under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel or the law of the case,
and disfavoring but allowing citation thereto if it has persuasive value and would assist the court
in reaching its disposition); 11TH C. it 36-2 (denying precedential value to unpublished
opinions while allowing citation thereto as "persuasive authority").
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properly conceived and utilized, need not be merely tolerated as a necessary evil,
but rather can and should be viewed as a key mechanism for effective and
appropriate decisionmaking by the federal courts of appeals.
II. THE UNIQUE FEAT RFS OF THE Coums OF APPEALS
The federal courts of appeals occupy a unique place and exercise unique
powers within the federal judiciary. Their decisions carry more authoritative
weight than those of the district courts, which exercise broad discretion on a range
of issues, but whose legal rulings lack binding precedential effect, and the Courts
of Appeals carry a substantially greater caseload than the Supreme Court, which
commands the observance of the district and circuit courts but which decides only
a relative handful of cases per year. In this position, the courts of appeals face a
variety of particular institutional challenges, all of which affect virtually every
aspect of the courts' business, including their use of unpublished opinions. A full
understanding and proper assessment of the role of unpublished opinions must
take into consideration the interaction of the circuit courts' four defining
characteristics.
A. The Federal Courts ofAppeals Have Mandatory Jurisdiction
By law, any and every litigant dissatisfied with a judgment at the district
court level has an appeal as of right to the court of appeals in her circuit 5 The
federal courts of appeals thus have no effective means of controlling the number
or types of cases that come before them. Though a court of appeals has some
discretion when deciding how to resolve cases on its docket, it must render an on-
the-record disposition in every case in which an appeal is sought.6
This characteristic sharply distinguishes the courts of appeals from the
Supreme Court, which is able to structure its caseload and decisionmaking
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
6 The methods of on-the-record dispositions vary from circuit to circuit. See 1sT CR. 1-
27.1 & 36.1 (allowing for summary disposition and permitting the court to choose the method
of disposition: order, memorandum and order, or opinion); 2ND CaR R. 023 (permitting
disposition in open court or by summary order); 3RD Ca. INT. OP. PROC. 62 (permitting use of
judgment order as a method of disposition); 4TH CR. R. 36(b) (permitting the use of
unpublished opinions); 5TH CIR. R. 47.6 (allowing affirmance without opinion); 6TH CIR. R. 19
(providing for disposition in open court after oral arguments); 7TH C R. K 53(c) (permitting the
use of unpublished orders); 8TH CI R. 47A (allowing the use of summary disposition); 8TH
Ca R. 47B (permitting affirmance, and sanctioning enforcement, without opinion); 9TH CIR.
R. 3-6 (providing for summary disposition); 10TH Ca>. R. 27.2 (providing for summary
disposition); 10TH CIR. K 36.1 (allowing the court to dispose of certain appeals by unpublished
order); 11TH CI R. 36-1 (providing for affirmance without opinion); D.C. C. R. 36(b)
(permitting the court to use abbreviated disposition methods when deemed appropriate); FED.
CI. R. 36 (providing for affirmance without opinion).
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through the exercise of its certiorari power.7 By limiting and carefully selecting
the petitions to be decided on the merits, the Supreme Court can determine the
time, manner, and context in which it will resolve particular issues. If the legal
issue in a petition for certiorari does not seem ripe for resolution, or if a particular
case presents that issue in a peculiar manner, or even if the parties and their
counsel simply appear unable to brief and argue the issue effectively, the
Supreme Court can avoid consideration of the issue through denial of certiorari.
Moreover, even on those occasions when the Court does exercise its discretion to
hear a particular case, the Court may define and shape the issues to be decided
through the wording of its grant of certiorari.
The courts of appeals have no such control over the content of their dockets.8
They may not decline to hear an appeal that falls within their mandatory
jurisdiction, and they have only a limited practical authority to defer resolution of
such an appeal.9 Moreover, unless the appeal raises multiple issues, resolution of
any one of which would represent a full disposition of the appeal, the court is not
at liberty to pick and choose among the issues presented. In this way, the courts of
appeals resemble the federal district courts, which, with very narrow exceptions,
must hear cases within their subject matter jurisdiction.' 0 In both the courts of
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994 & Supp. m1 1997).
8 Interestingly, Professors Reynolds and Richman contend and complain that the use of
unpublished opinions, when combined with other court practices, has now resulted in a form of
de facto certiorari which denies, at least to some litigants, the full benefits of an appeal of right
See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275 (1996)
[hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari]; see also William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation ofLimited Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 598, 625-26 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds &
Richman, Price ofReform]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication
in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE LJ. 807, 821 [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman,
Limited Publication]. Though the accuracy of this claim is certainly subject to dispute, see Carl
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1264 (1996), we suggest in Part II that some benefits may flow from the ability of unpublished
opinions to give courts of appeals some certiorari-like control over the discharge of their
lawmaking function. See infra text accompanying notes 38-45.
9 This assertion applies only to appeals from final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1994 & Supp. 1m 1997). The courts of appeals do have discretionary authority to accept or
reject interlocutory appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
Interlocutory appeals, however, represent only a tiny fraction-typically less than 0.50/--of the
courts of appeals' dockets. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1176, 1198-99 (1990) (documenting small
number of appeals brought via § 1292(b) and urging greater use of interlocutory appeals).
10 Indeed, the district courts might even be viewed as having more control over their
docket than the circuit courts, since a trial judge typically has considerable means to cajole
parties into settlements if she believes, for whatever reason, that formally adjudicating a
particular dispute would be inappropriate.
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appeals and the district courts, the litigants, rather than the courts, determine
which, how, and when issues must be addressed.
B. The Federal Courts ofAppeals Are, Effectively, Courts of Last Resort
The combination of mandatory jurisdiction at the circuit court level and
discretionary jurisdiction at the Supreme Court level means that, for nearly all
appellate litigants, their cases will end with a disposition by the court of appeals.
For the year ending in September 1998, the federal courts of appeals resolved
nearly 25,000 cases on the merits, while the Supreme Court in its 1998-99 Term
chose to give full review to fewer than 70 cases arising from the federal circuit
courts.1I In individual cases, the reality that the circuits are the de facto courts of
last resort affects not only the litigants, who realize that they most likely have
only one appellate forum in which to press their claims, but also the circuit court
judges, who realize that they have a special obligation to try to achieve the best
possible resolution of every dispute.
The significance of final review at the court of appeals level extends well
beyond the parties and the individual judges in individual cases. Although the
Supreme Court's decisions garner most of the attention from the media and the
academy, most of the legal developments within the federal judiciary-the
evolution of doctrines old and new through innovations and retrenchments in
statutory interpretation and constitutional analysis--occur not at the Supreme
Court but within the courts of appeals. The circuit courts are almost always the
first appellate voice on the panoply of legal issues that occupy the federal courts,12
and on many issues they remain-at least for a substantial period of time-the
only appellate voice.
C. In the Federal Court ofAppeals, Three-Judge Panels Speakfor the
Entire Court
Though the Supreme Court frequently speaks with a fractured voice, almost
all of its decisions are rendered by a full court of nine Justices. 13 That is, each
Justice has an opportunity to contribute her or his vote and opinion in each and
11 See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, 113 HARv. L. REv. 400,408 tbl.II(E) (1999); see
also G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 41 figs.2-3 (2d ed.
1998) (noting that the Supreme Court generally reviews considerably less than one percent of
circuit court cases terminated on the merits).
12In a few settings with cases involving certain subject matters (e.g., bankruptcy
proceedings, some administrative matters) the existence of specialized tribunals sometimes
creates a layer of appellate review which precedes review in the federal courts of appeals.
13 Examples of instances in which a Court of fewer than nine Justices may render a
decision include: The existence of a vacancy on the bench, the illness of a Justice, and recusal
of a Justice for areal or perceived conflict of interest.
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every case. The courts of appeals, in contrast, do most of their work in panels of
three judges.14 Nearly all of the decisions rendered are the product not of the
whole court, but of a randomly selected group of three judges who purport to
speak for the entire court. Thus, except for those relatively rare instances when a
case is considered en banc,15 only a small minority of a circuit's active judges
directly participate in the adjudication of each particular case. 16 Moreover,
because panels will often include a senior judge, a judge from another circuit, or
even a district court judge sitting by designation, it is not uncommon for only two
or even just one active judge of the circuit to participate in the resolution of
certain cases.17
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994) (permitting the courts of appeals to hear and determine
cases by separate panels consisting of three judges).
15 Section 46 of the Judicial Code authorizes bane review. Although each Circuit has
adopted its own particular procedural requirements for initiating en bane review or re-hearing,
the subject of en bane review is dealt with generally by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). Rule 35(a) states: "An en bane hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en bane consideration is
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. APP. PROC. 35(a)(1999). Rule 35(a)
provides that a majority of the judges in active service may order that an appeal or proceeding
be heard en bane. Rule 35(b)(1) requires that a party seeking en bane review of a panel decision
must state that the petition is necessary to address a conflict in the law between the circuit and
the Supreme Court, or within the circuit itself, or that the appeal involves questions of
"exceptional importance." Id. at 35(b)(1).
Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3 permits for a limited en bane court. The Rule states that the en
bane court shall consist of the chief judge of the circuit and ten additional judges to be chosen
by lot from the active judges of the court. See 9TH CIR R 35-3.
16 The circuits range in size from six to twenty-eight judges:
1st: 6 6th: 16 11th: 12
2nd: 13 7th: 11 D.C.: 12
3rd: 14 8th: 11 Fed.: 12
4th: 15 9th: 28
5th 17 10th: 12
28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994). Thus, assuming all of the circuit's seats were filled, a panel of three
judges would represent at most one-half and as little as eleven percent of the circuit's active
judges. The existence of vacancies might improve these numbers somewhat. See Vacancy List
by Circuit and District Report Oast modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://uscourts.gov/vacancies/
judgevacancy.htm> (reporting 27 vacancies and 18 pending nominations for the federal courts
of appeals as of February 1, 2000). Vacancies within a circuit, however, would also be likely to
increase the number of panels that were not composed entirely of active circuit judges. See infra
note 17.
17 For the year ending in September 1998, nearly 25% of the judges participating in
dispositions were either senior or visiting judges. In a number of circuits, this percentage
exceeded 30%, and in the Second Circuit, it approached 50%. See ADM4IM5RATIVE OFFICE OF
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D. The Federal Courts ofAppeals Create Precedent That Is Binding on
Themselves
Though only a fraction of the active judges on the court are involved in most
circuit court decisions, those decisions have, in a sense, more precedential weight
than decisions rendered by other courts within the federal judiciary. When a
federal district judge renders a decision, she speaks in the name of the district
court, but the decision does not bind her fellow judges.18 In practice, she speaks
only for herself, and even then her decision does not formally bind her in future
cases. For its part, the Supreme Court issues decisions that are binding on the
courts of appeals and the district courts, but the Court itself remains free to change
its course, bound only by the varying degree of respect it holds for the doctrine of
stare decisis. 19
At the court of appeals, in contrast, the entire court considers itself bound in
all future cases by the decision of a prior panel. It is well-established precedent in
every circuit that one panel's reported holding can only be overruled through
procedures in which all of the active judges in the court participate2 0 The
principal method for doing this is review by the entire court sitting en banc, a
procedure that the courts of appeals collectively employ no more frequently than
the Supreme Court accepts certiorari.2' Given the rarity of en banc review, the
THE UNrrED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL Busmss OF THE UNTm STATES COURTS 1998 at 53
tbl.S-2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 JuDIciALBUsINEss].
18 See, e.g., Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A district court decision
binds no judge in any other case, save to the extent that doctrines of preclusion (not stare
decisis) apply.").
19For a recent appraisal of the Court's observance of stare decisis, see generally Thomas
R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Hitorical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court,
52 VAND. L. REv. 647 (1999).
20 Panels in each circuit have consistently stated that they lack the authority to overrule
decisions by prior panels; thus, as a general matter, a panel's decision binds subsequent panels
absent an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, act of Congress, or en bane decision by
the court as a whole. See, e.g., Dantzler v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 183 F3d 1247,
1250 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Turner v. United States, 183 F3d 474,476 (6th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 947 (8th Cir. 1998); Barber v. Johnson, 145 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.
1998); United States v. Nicholas, 133 F.3d 133, 136 (1st Cir. 1998); Ritz Carlton Hotel Co. v.
NLRB, 123 F.3d 760, 765 & nA (3d Cir. 1997); Roundy v. Commissioner, 122 F.3d 835, 837
(9th Cir. 1997); Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F3d 795, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Moore v.
Office of Personnel Mgmt., 113 F.3d 216, 218 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. Foster, 104
F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702,705 (7th Cir. 1996); Samuels
v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1993); Etheridge v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 9 F3d
1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 3rd CIR. INT. Op. PROC. 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this court
that the holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court en
bane consideration is required to do so.").
21 For the year ending in September 1998, there were a total of only 65 en bane
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effective result is that each three-judge panel's decision not only purports to
represent the entire court in the case at hand, but it also commands the allegiance
of all future panels in the consideration of subsequent cases. 2
II-. RETHINKING THE ROLE AND VALUE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
A. The Standard Arguments for and Against Unpublished Opinions
Both supporters and critics of the use of unpublished opinions tend to focus
on the first or second of the four distinguishing characteristics of the courts of
appeals discussed above. That is, much of the scholarly commentary on
unpublished opinions, both pro and con, has given primary attention to the need
for circuit courts to resolve cases expeditiously and soundly: Support for
unpublished opinions is typically based on a concern about the workload
difficulties created by mandatory jurisdiction, while complaints about
unpublished opinions center around the potential for diminished justice in the
federal appeals courts that serve as de facto courts of last resort.23 As a result the
dispositions out of nearly 25,000 appeals terminated on the merits. See 1998 JUDICIAL
BUSINE S, supra note 17 at 52 tbl.S-1; see also CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL PoLrrlcS IN
THE D.C. CIRcurr COURT 100-101 & tbl.5 (1999) (detailing that, over a recent twenty-five year
period, circuit courts rendered en bane dispositions in only about 0.25% of all cases on their
docket).
It must be noted that several circuits observe practices, established with varying degrees of
formality, that permit one panel to overrule a decision of another (typically based on an
intervening decision of the Supreme Court or act of Congress) through circulation of its opinion
to the entire court. If a majority of the court does not vote to hear the issue en bane, the later
panel's analysis is permitted to displace the former panel's approach. For example, Seventh
Circuit Rule 40(e) provides:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which
would overrule a prior decision of this court... shall not be published unless it is first
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to
rehear en bane the issue of whether the position should be adopted.
7TH Cm. R. 40(e).
Other circuits have adopted a similar practice. See, e-g., United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d
494,496 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing practice in Second Circuit and others).
22 See BANKS, supra note 21, at 90 (noting that 'most times the panel outcome sets the
legal principle and controls the ideological direction of policy for the indeterminate future").
23 See, e.g., Martha 3. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeas Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757,785-800 (1995); Mitu Gulati & C.MA. McCauliff,
On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 173 (1998); Robert J. Martineau,
Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 119, 128-46 (1995); Phillip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One
Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 914 (1986); Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform,
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scholarly literature typically is concerned only with whether unpublished opinions
provide a sound or sensible means to deal with the practical pressures created by
litigants in the courts of appeals.
Chief Judge Martin's defense of unpublished opinions reflects this, as he
focuses upon the practical difficulties created by the circuit courts' mandatory
jurisdiction and the consequent workload created by the many litigants eager to
exercise their appeal rights. 24 As Chief Judge Martin puts it, the grant of appeals
as of right leads to "a lot of dross" in the dockets of the courts of appeals.2 5 He
argues that requiring published opinions in all cases would cause judges already
overburdened by swelling caseloads to spend too much of their limited time on
cases with little merit. 6 In addition, argues Chief Judge Martin, requiring the
publication of all dispositions would needlessly add to the bulk of the Federal
Reporter, by their sheer volume diminishing the cohesiveness and coherence of
the body of the law2 7 Unpublished opinions, in Chief Judge Martin's view, act as
a safety valve to relieve the pressure on both the judges' workloads and library
shelves groaning under the ever-increasing mass of published authority.
Where defenders of unpublished opinions tend to focus on the role of
unpublished opinions in reducing the burdens of mandatory jurisdiction,
opponents of unpublished opinions tend to focus on concerns related to the
position of the courts of appeals as courts of last resort for litigating parties.
Because the court of appeals will most likely be the final court to consider the
merits of the litigants' positions, opponents of unpublished opinions are
particularly concerned about the impact of unpublished opinions on the quality of
justice that the circuit courts deliver.28 These commentators frequently bemoan
the alacrity with which many unpublished opinions are written, suggesting that
the brief and unpolished summary memoranda issued by the court betray a lack of
careful thought on the part of the deciding judges.2 9 Worse, opponents note,
supra note 8, at 275. See generally THOMAs E. BAKER, RATIONING JuSTICE ON APPEAL: THE
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994).
24 See Martin, supra note 1, at 181-83.
25 hd at 191.
26 See id at 182-83.
27 See id at 192.
28 See Gulati & McCauliff supra note 23, at 160-61, 189-90, 193-94 (stating that the use
ofjudgment orders is not subject to external scrutiny, that the use ofjudgment orders will lead
to "neglected" areas of law, and that published opinions serve to produce legitimacy, stability,
and predictability); Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 8, at 820 (asserting
that published opinions, through articulated reasoning, give assurance that the appeal has
received the proper attention).
2 9 See Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 8, at 606 (suggesting that
unpublished opinions are of lower quality than published opinions); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THm FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGEAND REFORM 165 (1996) (noting the criticism that
unpublished opinions encourage sloppy judicial decisionmaking).
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unpublished opinions frequently reflect significant contributions by law clerks
and staff attorneys, individuals who lack the expertise and experience, let alone
the constitutionally granted authority, of Article III judges.30 The result is second-
class justice, or at least the perception of lesser justice, since parties whose
arguments are dismissed summarily in unpublished opinions may well feel that
they have not been treated with sufficient respect and that their claims have not
been given due consideration3 1
Within the context of these arguments, both proponents and opponents of
unpublished opinions do sometimes address broader concerns about the effect of
unpublished opinions on the development of precedent and the evolution of the
law.32 Those who oppose unpublished opinions suggest that appellate
jurisprudence tends to become stilted, or undeveloped, or lacking in uniformity or
predictability when courts can produce opinions that lack precedential value and
do not appear in the pages of the Federal Reporter.33 Defenders of unpublished
opinions, in contrast, argue that, because a large number of appeals turn on the
application of well-settled points of law to familiar patterns of fact, the resolution
of all cases through published opinions would add nothing of jurisprudential
value.34
30 See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 8, at 837 (noting that
increased staff involvement generally results in the judge being less likely to give the case "a
fresh, inquiring look"); see also William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of
the Federal Courts, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 1, 4 (suggesting the need to maintain a line between
judges performing their judicial work with the assistance of law clerks, which is appropriate,
and judges merely supervising the work of law clerks, which is not).
31 See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 52 (noting that, where a case is decided without either oral argument or
published opinion, the "parties have little assurance that the judges have paid attention to their
case").
32 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 23, at 189-92 (arguing that the use of judgment
orders will allow certain judges to "capture" certain areas of the law, that judgment orders will
lead to the development of neglected areas of the law, and that judgment orders allow judges to
determine which cases are used to establish precedent); Martin, supra note 1, at 191 (noting that
the use of unpublished opinions serves to increase the precedential value of those opinions that
are published); Nichols, supra note 23, at 916 (noting that selectivity in the publication of
opinions serves to confer greater precedential authority on those opinions which are published);
Reynolds & Richman, Price ofReform, supra note 8, at 579-80 (contending that every case has
some precedential value, and that "cumulative" opinions have a reinforcing effect).
33 See Robe], supra note 31, at 52.
34 See, e.g., Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1385, 1393 (1990) (asserting that "most unpublished opinions are so
fact-specific and precedent-bound that their major use would be simply to clutter briefs with
longer string citations").
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B. A More Complete Perspective on Unpublished Opinions
While all of these arguments have merit and deserve consideration in any
assessment of unpublished opinions, the scholarly commentary remains
incomplete for failing to take full account of all the unique attributes of the courts
of appeals. Neither supporters nor critics of unpublished opinions have fully
integrated into their analysis the unique institutional pressures of the federal
courts of appeals: the lack of control that the courts of appeals have over their
dockets, the operation of the circuit courts through three-judge panels, and the
firm precedential value of published appellate decisions. Each of these
characteristics profoundly impacts the manner in which the courts of appeals
develop an appellate jurisprudence, especially since, as Chief Judge Martin aptly
observes, not all cases are equal.35 Accordingly, only by considering these unique
features of the courts of appeals can the role and value of unpublished opinions in
the evolution of federal law be fully appreciated.
A court's ruling not only resolves the case at hand, but also sets a precedent
that affects future cases. Thus, judges must strive to reach a just result in light of
the facts and existing law in each individual case, while simultaneously being
mindful of and attentive to the broad legal landscape and the direction of legal
change. In the context of appellate decisionmaking, this means that judges must
carefully review and correct any errors that may have impacted the determination
below while at the same time articulating abstract legal concepts in a manner that
will effectively guide the consideration of future cases. That is, appellate judges
have the dual obligations of "error correction" and "lawmaldng."36 Moreover, for
an appellate tribunal that serves as a de facto court of last resort, these dual
obligations can be especially weighty. Such a court presents the final forum for
errors to be corrected and for justice to be achieved in the case at hand, while the
court's decisions, in the absence of action by a superior authority, shape the
dynamics and direction of the legal landscape.37
35 See Martin, supra note 1, at 183, 191 (noting that "not all cases are of equal merit'.
36 See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commentary at 5 (1994 ed.) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]
("The appellate courts have two functions: to review individual cases to assure that substantial
justice has been rendered, and to formulate and develop the law for general application in the
legal system.'); BAKER, supra note 23, at 14-16; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON
APPEAL 2-4 (1976); see also Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 868 (1984)
(explaining that "the Supreme Court is generally thought to be in the business of law
announcement rather than error correction. The intermediate appellate courts, in contrast, have
both the 'institutional' function of rle development and the obligation to review for correctness
and appropriateness.).
37 See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory ofDecisionmaking on U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 58 OHuo. ST. LJ. 1635, 1635-36 (1998) (highlighting that, because of the very
limited number of cases reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, "the circuit courts have become
the courts of last resort for most litigants and the sources of doctrinal development for most
1999] 2035
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNJAL
Judicial decisionmaking, especially at the appellate level, presents special
challenges, because the dual obligations in each case to achieve a just result in the
matter at hand and to further just law for future cases create differing demands
and can often be in tension. Consider, for instance, a court's position when
concluding on appeal that there was some procedural flaw in a lower-court
proceeding, but that this flaw in the case at hand does not justify reversing the
decision below. The appellate court's obligation to achieve a just result in this
individual case (its error-correction function) could be discharged by a simple
affirmance, but the court's obligation to further just law for future cases (its
lawmaking function) would require a meaningful and instructive explanation of
both the mistake that occurred below and the reasons why this mistake should not
lead to a reversal.
Moreover, and of critical importance for a full appreciation of the appellate
courts' work, though the dual obligations of error correction and lawmaking often
create differing demands, they are always inextricably linked. Judges' perceptions
of and contribution to the legal landscape and legal trends will always be
impacted by the specific facts and procedural posture of the case before them, as
well as by the specific arguments developed (and not developed) by the parties.
Consequently, appellate courts' development of the law is inevitably affected by
the order and the manner in which individual cases come before the court. Even
though courts cannot possibly know or foresee all the contexts in which future
cases will raise certain legal issues, their initial decisions on particular issues in
the context of individual cases will shape, through the power of precedent, the
framework within which future cases are decided.
These dynamics combine with the institutional structure of the federal courts
of appeals to produce considerable difficulties for the sound and sensible
development of the law. Because of the courts' mandatory jurisdiction, litigants
ultimately determine both when and how cases are presented to the courts of
appeals. In other words, the error-correction function of the federal circuits sets
the agenda for and the parameters of their decisionmaking. As a result, circuit
judges will sometimes first confront novel or important legal issues within cases
that are factually or procedurally atypical, or which are poorly developed, briefed
and argued by counsel. Accordingly, circuit courts must unavoidably consider
some consequential legal questions in less-than-ideal contexts for the discharge of
their lawmaking functions3 8 And yet, because of the binding force given to
circuit court precedents, early decisions rendered in such imperfect settings may
legal issues").
38 Cf. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE LI. 62, 69-71 (1985) (suggesting that allowing appellate courts to select which cases to
review might better serve their lawmaking finction because an "appellate court arguably is in
the best position to determine whether, where, when and how the law is in need of clarification
or revision").
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establish how all future cases raising the particular legal issue are litigated and
decided.
For these reasons, judges may quite justifiably be reluctant in some cases to
issue a firm and conclusive legal decision for fear that they might harmfully
"petrify" the precedential framework for the consideration of future cases. A court
may realize that the imperfect context or imperfect manner in which certain issues
are raised in a particular case makes the case an especially poor vehicle for the
creation and development of sound legal doctrine. An appellate court faced with
such a case, though obliged to render a decision that discharges its error-
correction function, may sensibly seek to avoid or limit the discharging of its
lawmaking function.
Indeed, this reluctance to engage in lawmaking may be reinforced by the fact
that the federal courts of appeals operate through three-judge panels, the decisions
of which bind the entire court. A three-judge panel that confronts a novel or
important legal issue might, even in the best of settings, be justifiably reticent
about establishing a definitive precedent before other judges can have some input.
Such reticence may stem from a circuit judge's general disinclination to speak for
and bind fellow judges before having some inkling of their views, or in some
cases from a circuit judge's candid appreciation that colleagues may be more
knowledgeable or familiar with a particular area of law.39 Accordingly, when a
particular panel is forced to confront a consequential legal issue in a less-than-
ideal context, the case for consciously avoiding the issuance of a firm and
conclusive legal decision becomes especially compelling.
The idea that a court should exercise its lawmaking function prudently when
novel issues arise in less-than-ideal circumstances is not new. In particular, the
notion that the Supreme Court should at times purposely avoid premature
definitive rulings has a long and distinguished history. Alexander Bickel sounded
this theme nearly forty years ago when promoting "passive virtues"--the use of
jurisdictional devices to avoid adjudication-as a means for the Supreme Court to
39 We recognize, of course, the contrary possibility of strategic behavior. Especially on
ideologically-divided courts, members of a particular panel may view a case presenting novel
issues as an opportunity to bind their differently minded colleagues, regardless of the
peculiarities of the individual case. See Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course. The Use of
Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 477, 479 (1987)
(discussing her belief that "some judges have definite 'agendas' for changing the law in certain
areas, such as restricting access to the federal courts, and that they diligently pursue these
agendas at every opportunity"); see also Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal
Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. Prrr. L. RaV.
805, 823-27 (1993) (suggesting that a value of increased use of en banc procedures is to
prevent possible "minority control of circuit law"); see generally BANKS, supra note 21
(reviewing the impact of ideological differences on the decisionmaldig of the D.C. Court of
Appeals). But the prospect of significant strategic behavior in circuit court decisionmaking,
though perhaps altering the use and impact of unpublished decisions in particular courts, does
not invalidate our analysis or significantly undermine our proposal.
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ensure principled constitutional decisionmaking. 40 Writing in a similar vein, Cass
Sunstein has recently touted "decisional minimalism"--judicial efforts to keep
judgments "shallow and narrow"-as a means to fortify democratic processes.4
Significantly, both of these commentators advocated means to avoid or limit
Supreme Court adjudications in order to facilitate institutional dialogues: Bickel
urged techniques for the Court to withhold constitutional judgment so as to enable
the Court to engage "in a Socratic colloquy with the other institutions of
government and with society as a whole concerning the necessity for this or that
measure .... -42 Sunstein likewise asserts that minimalist adjudication by the
Court is "democracy-forcing" and thus valuable as a means to "leave open the
most fundamental and difficult constitutional questions [and] also... promote
democratic accountability and democratic deliberation."43
Reduced to their essence, the arguments of both Bickel and Sunstein suggest
that it may at times be sensible, valuable, and appropriate for a court to avoid
lawmaking 44 Of course, Bickel and Sunstein write with the Supreme Court in
mind, and they urge the avoidance of premature lawmaldng by that body in order
to ensure that other government institutions also have appropriate opportunities to
make law. Nevertheless, their core insights about the value of judges seeking to
avoid premature precedents merit particular attention within the context of federal
circuit court decisionmaking. Because the unique institutional structure of the
courts of appeals presents a particular and troublesome risk of a harmful
"petrification' of precedent, it may be especially important and valuable for
40 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, TiE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLMCS (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). Bickel was greatly concerned by
the fact that the High Court's "function of declaring principled goals" was often forced to
operate within the context of decisions by "political institutions do[ne] merely on grounds of
expediency." See Bickel, supra, at 50; see also BICKEL, supra, at 64, 68. Bickel thus identified
and advocated various techniques or devices that allow the Supreme Court to withhold ultimate
"constitutional adjudication" so as to best strike an "accommodation between principle and
expediency." Bickel, supra, at 50; see also BICKEL, supra, at 69-71. For a contemporaneous
account and criticism of Bickel's ideas, see generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1964) (reviewing BICKEL, supra). For a modem account and defense of Bickel's
ideas, see generally Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALEL.J. 1567 (1985).
4 1 See CASS R. SUNSTEN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3-4 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 3,4 (1996).
42 BICKEL, supra note 40, at 70-71.
43 SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 6.
44 For a critical review of Sunstein's arguments which also suggests that Sunstein's ideas
are linked more closely to Bickel's than Sunstein himself acknowledges, see Neal Devins, The
Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1971 (1999) (reviewing SUNsTEIN, supra
note 41).
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circuit judges to consciously avoid lawmaking in some instances.
Moreover, the interest of Bickel and Sunstein in promoting institutional
dialogues also has special import within the context of federal circuit court
decisionmaking. Though a three-judge panel confronted with a poorly presented
legal issue may often sensibly seek to avoid handcuffing subsequent
consideration of that issue, the circuit judges of the panel still can and should
endeavor to render a decision with the potential to inform, and perhaps guide the
efforts of future panels. That is, while properly seeking to avoid the premature
creation of binding precedents when a novel or important issue arises in an
imperfect setting, circuit judges should embrace and utilize these cases to begin a
dialogue among the judges of the court by issuing opinions that will aid the future
consideration of the legal issue in question. This dialogue may be intra-
institutional, in contrast to the dialogue among government institutions and
between those institutions and society envisioned by Bickel and Sunstein, but it
nevertheless has the potential to advance and improve the functioning of the
courts of appeals.
Unfortunately, at present, judges on the federal courts of appeals have few
real options for effectively and appropriately avoiding definitive judgments while
still facilitating a dialogue on a particular legal issue: Published opinions create
binding precedent, while unpublished opinions may not be cited at all or only in
limited circumstance in many circuits. Thus, in the context of having to render
decisions as a reviewing court with mandatory jurisdiction, the circuit courts are
often faced with a pair of decisionmaking options, neither of which can
effectively further the sensible development of the law 45 It is within this context
that we urge a reconception of the unpublished opinion, which we believe may
provide a way out of this dilemma.
To this point, unpublished opinions have been viewed and debated, attacked
and defended almost exclusively as a tool for disposing of the routine case in
which the law is well settled. But, in the end, for the truly routine cases,
publication rules are largely inconsequential and noncitation rules are superfluous.
If a case genuinely calls only for a straightforward application of well-settled law,
then it is likely to receive summary treatment whether or not the opinion is subject
4 5 A third option, the crafting of a very narrow published opinion designed solely for the
particular facts before the court, does not satisfactorily resolve the dilemma. Although such an
opinion might properly resolve the individual case, thus fulfilling the court's error-correcting
function, its limited focus would prevent it from contributing in a meaningful or effective way
to the evolution of the law. From the lawmaking perspective, in other words, a truly narrow
published opinion crafted only to resolve the case at hand is little different from an unpublished,
uncitable opinion. Moreover, whenever an opinion is designed to be nanow but in fact says
more than is absolutely necessary to resolve the case at hand, the decision's failure to provide a
full statement of a clear legal rule will likely engender more problems than it will avoid. See
generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. Li. 297, 339-43
(1996) (discussing some of the disadvantages ofnarrow rulings).
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to publication.4 6 Moreover, since such an opinion by definition does not add or
otherwise change the law, there is no real need or reason for either a litigant or a
judge to cite to it 47
But the analysis developed above highlights the potential role and value of
unpublished opinions in the consideration of those cases in which the law is novel
or otherwise underdeveloped or in which the facts, procedural posture, or the
litigants present the issue in a less-than-ideal way. An unpublished opinion,
lacking full precedential weight, would permit an appellate panel to resolve the
case before it, as it must, without tying the entire court into a particular mode of
analysis that will govern future cases. It would also, however, have the potential
to guide the court in future determinations, allowing the various members of the
court to engage in a dialogue with each other across cases and across panels.
Because such a dialogue would engage and draw upon a set of fact patterns and a
collection of judges, it likely would facilitate the development of the law better
than the present system, in which the first panel that, by happenstance, encounters
an issue may set in stone the analysis that all subsequent panels must follow.
Of course, unpublished opinions of this type could only play the role
suggested for them if they were both accessible to lawyers and judges and capable
of being cited in briefs to the court (and, arguably, in subsequent published
opinions). With the spread of the Intemet and the availability of unpublished
opinions on the commercial online research services, accessibility is an ever-
diminishing problem.48 The more serious issue is citabiity: At present, nearly half
46 See Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1485, 1494-95 (1995) (reviewing
BAKER, supra note 23) (suggesting that the fleshing out of opinions that are currently
unpublished for publication would not add to the legal analysis but simply engage courts in
"time-consuming editorial tasks"); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 189-90 (suggesting that
unpublished opinions are short not because they are unpublished, but because they "tend to
involve settled law and variations on the facts"); cf. POSNER, supra note 29, at 272-74 (arguing
that published per curiam opinions, disposing of appeals in surmnmry fashion, became less
common as unpublished opinions became more used).
4 7 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 36 § 3.37 commentary at 70 (noting that "many
decisions [of appellate courts] are of little interest or use to anyone other than the immediate
parties"). While some critics of unpublished opinions contend that every decision offers some
insights into even well-settled law, see Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 8, at
579-80, 607 (arguing that all decisions make law in that they show how courts actually resolve
disputes), it must be conceded that decisions which apply clearly established rules of law to
familiar fact pattems are truly of almost no precedential value or impact
4 8 See Dragich, supra note 23, at 792 (noting that unpublished opinions "are now widely
available, particularly through online legal research services" and researchers "can find
unpublished opinions just as easily as published ones"); Martin, supra note 1, at 185-86 (noting
that most unpublished opinions are in fact accessible online, rendering the differentiation
between "published" and "unpublished" opinions "a fine, almost meaningless,... distinction").
The broad and still-increasing availability of unpublished opinions answers the critique made
by Reynolds and Richman that the courts will use unpublished opinions to secretly resolve
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the circuits do not permit citation of an unpublished opinion in a case other than
the one in which the opinion was rendered4 9 In this regard, the Sixth Circuit's
rule on citation of unpublished opinions comes closer to permitting the optimal
use of unpublished opinions than do the rules of many other circuits. Sixth Circuit
Rules 10(f) and 24(c) permit citation of unpublished opinions if those opinions
relate to an issue in the case and are more directly on point than published
opinions5 o The Sixth Circuit's rule avoids the routine citation of unpublished
opinions, while also providing a vehicle for communication among panels, and
thus allows litigants to be the catalysts for such communication.
In sum, then, we believe that the strongest argument for unpublished opinions
is not premised on the efficiency concerns that are at the center of Chief Judge
Martin's defense. Rather, we believe unpublished opinions have their greatest
value as a mechanism that can help the courts of appeals navigate their unique
institutional challenges to develop legal doctrine in the soundest and most
effective manner. Put another way, though unpublished opinions clearly have
value and importance as time-savers, it is their ability to serve as "precedent-
savers" that makes the case for them compelling.
The model of unpublished opinions that we propose here is neither formally
or practically unfamiliar. As a formal matter, one must recognize and appreciate
that district courts routinely issue unpublished opinions that may be cited in
subsequent cases5 l Indeed, because publication at the district court level depends
cases contrary to established lines of precedent. See Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform,
supra note 8, at 581, 611.
49 Compare lST CiR. R. 362(bX6) (allowing citation of unpublished opinions only in
related cases), and 2D CIH. R. 0.23 (same), and 7TH Ca. R. 53(bX2Xiv) (prohibiting citation to
unpublished orders except for purposes of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or law of the
case), and 9TH CR. R. 36-3 (same) and D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (prohibiting citation to unpublished
opinions for purposes other than preclusion), and FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (prohibiting citation to
opinions designated non-precedential except for purposes of claim preclusion, issue preclusion,
judicial estoppel, or law of the case) with 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) (citation to unpublished opinions is
disfavored but is permissible where counsel believes that no published opinion would serve as
well), and 5TH CIR. R. 47.5A (stating that an unpublished opinion is not precedent but may be
persuasive), and 6TH CIR. R. 24(c) (citation to unpublished opinions is disfavored but is
permissible where counsel believes that no published opinion would serve as well), and 8TH
CUa R. 28A(k) (allowing citation where the unpublished opinion is persuasive and no other
opinion would serve as well), and 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (unpublished opinion may be cited if it is
persuasive, no published opinion has addressed the issue, and citation would assist the court),
and 11TH CR. R. 36-2 (unpublished opinion is not binding precedent but may be persuasive).
The Third Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures state that the court will not itself cite to
unpublished opinions but do not mention whether such citations may be used in briefs
submitted to the court See 3RD CIa INT. OP. PROC. 5.8. It appears that lawyers in the Third
Circuit do in fact cite unpublished Third Circuit decisions in their briefs.
50 See supra note 4.
51 But see D.C. CaR R. 28(c) (prohibitingcitation to unpublished district court opinions as
well as unpublished opinions of the D.C. Circuit and the other federal circuit courts of appeals).
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almost entirely on the disposition of the individual district judge, a significant
number of lengthy and carefully reasoned opinions do not find their way into the
Federal Supplement. Although these opinions do not appear in the official
reporters, they are easily accessible through the commercial online services; as
well, many appear in unofficial specialized reporters and thus may be found in a
well-stocked law library. Of course, these opinions lack any binding precedential
value. Their weight depends, instead, on their persuasive power. So it would be
with unpublished appellate opinions.
Moreover, as a practical matter, there is good reason to believe that
unpublished appellate opinions are in some instances already playing the role in
circuit court decisionmaking that we advocate. 52 A recent study of Judgment
Orders in the Third Circuit has highlighted the internal judicial incentives to
render decisions in certain hard cases without a published opinion,53 and a
number of commentators have noted that unpublished opinions are often used to
dispose of difficult and complex cases as well as simple and routine ones.54
Though these observations are typically couched in harsh criticisms of judges'
failure to fulfill their judicial obligations to give complete and careful
consideration to individual cases,55 in at least some cases these dispositions might
be viewed more properly as instances in which an appellate panel concluded-
perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously--that the legal landscape would be
better served by avoiding the possible petrification of precedent that could follow
from a published opinion in these cases.56 In the end, our proposed reconception
52 Cf Martineau, supra note 23, at 145 (stating that "there is no question that some
opinions that make law are still designated 'not for publication").
53 See generally Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 23.
54 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 23, at 125; Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the
System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 109, 128-30 (1995); see also Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari, supra note 8, at
286 n.64 (suggesting, without citation, that there is "widespread belief at the bar that judges
sometimes use the non-publication route to reach decisions that cannot be squared with
controlling authority").
5 5 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29.
5 6 Cf. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 23, at 176 (suggesting that the "system of
precedent ... may be better served not by giving a published statement of published reasons in
every hard case, but by avoiding some of these cases, focusing instead on the somewhat less
difficult cases in which the appellate panel can contribute to the development of the law... .);
see also Jones, supra note 46, at 1495 (suggesting that "the law would develop more carefully"
if judges decided more cases by unpublished decisions and could thereby devote more time to
decisions that will be published); Diana Gribbon Motz, A Federal Judge's View ofRichardA.
Posner's The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1029, 1038
(1998) (book review) (suggesting that circuit judges' production of even unpublished opinions
is an "inefficient use of resources [because too much time is] spent 'polishing' aspects of
unpublished opinions [that] could be better spent researching more complex points of law....
Disposing of at least some such cases by order would leave more time for both judges and their
staffs to improve the quality of precedent-creating work."). See generally Frederick Schauer,
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of unpublished opinions may truly be no more than a suggestion that courts make
overt-and expressly embrace-an important device that they are already
utilizing, whether they realize it or not.
Last but not least, before we conclude our account of the potential doctrinal
benefits of a reconception of unpublished opinions, we should address our
proposal's impact on the traditional practical argument in favor of such
dispositions. Specifically, we must concede that, under our conception and within
the parameters described above, unpublished opinions may not significantly
reduce the courts' workload. For unpublished opinions to serve the function of
guiding future courts, they will likely require much of the thought, research, and
care in drafting that is given to published opinions. Nevertheless, even within our
model, unpublished opinions should still provide some relief relative to published
opinions. Because courts will draft these opinions without the burden of having to
create sound precedent for all future cases, they can and should be completed
more expeditiously than published decisions.
Moreover, our proposal should not drastically undermine the efficiency value
of unpublished opinions that Chief Judge Martin promotes. The truly routine
cases that are presently decided by unpublished opinion can still be decided by
unpublished opinion within our model, and because of the existence of superior
published precedent, the opinions will tend to remain uncited. The additional role
that we see for unpublished opinions would simply create a means by which the
courts of appeals could continue to exercise the mandatory jurisdiction assigned
to them while improving the procedures by which they fulfill their lawmaking
functions.
GivingReasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 656-59 (1995) (highlighting that the commitments that
stem from giving reasons for decisions do not come without a price in the consideration of
future cases).

